

**Maestría de Economía, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.**  
**Economía de la Información (2 créditos).**  
**Año: 2020**

Profesor: Walter Cont  
Ayudante: Daniel Fernández

Fechas de clases: a combinar entre sábados de 9:00-12:00 y miércoles 19:00-22:00. Clases de ayudantía a ser asignadas.

Método de Evaluación en dos componentes: un examen final (80% de la nota final) y trabajos prácticos (20% de la nota)

**Programa**

**Tema 1: El Problema Principal-Agente**

Moral Hazard  
Múltiples Agentes–Teams  
Múltiples Tareas–Multitask  
Múltiples Principales–Common Agency

**Tema 2: Diseño de Mecanismos y Aplicaciones**

Selección adversa  
Diseño de Mecanismos  
Discriminación de precios  
Regulación con información asimétrica  
Impuestos con información asimétrica  
Extensión a multi-types  
Estructuras jerárquicas  
Subastas

**Referencias Tema 1:**

Bolton y Dewatripont (2005). Contract Theory, MIT Press. Capítulo 4.  
Laffont y Martimort (2004), The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press, caps 4 y 5.  
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Microeconomic Theory, cap. 13.  
Grossman y Hart (1983), *Econometrica*.  
Bernheim, and Whinston (1986), “Common Agency”, *Econometrica*, vol. 54, pp. 911-930.  
Holmstrom (1982), “Moral Hazard in Teams”, *Bell Journal of Economics*, vol. 13, pp. 324-340.  
Itoh (1991); “Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations”, *Econometrica*, Vol. 59, pp. 611-636.  
Che y Yoo (2001), “Optimal Incentives for Teams”, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 91, pp. 525-541.  
Fleckinger (2011), “Correlation and Relative Performance Evaluation”, *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 147, pp.93-117.  
Legros, and Matthews (1993), “Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships”, *Review of Economic Studies*, vol. 68, pp. 599-611.

Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analysis", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 7, pp. 24-52.

Ishiguro (2004), "Collusion and Discrimination in Organizations", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 116, pp. 357-369.

### **Referencias Tema 2:**

Bolton y Dewatripont (2005). Contract Theory, MIT Press. Capítulos 2, 6 y 9.

Laffont, J.J. y D. Martimort (2004), The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press, caps 2, 3 y 8.

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Microeconomic Theory, caps. 14 y parte del 24.

Baron and Myerson (1982), "Regulating a Monopoly with Unknown Costs", *Econometrica*, vol. 50, pp. 911-930.

Laffont and Tirole (1986), "Using Cost to Regulate Firms", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 94, pp. 614-641.

Maskin, E. y J. Riley (1984), "Monopoly with Incomplete Information", *RAND Journal of Economics*, vol. 15, pp. 171-196.

Mirrlees, J. (1971), "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation", *The Review of Economic Studies*, vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 175-208.

Armstrong (1996), "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing", *Econometrica*, vol. 64, pp. 51-76.

Armstrong and Rochet (1999), "Multidimensional Screening: A User's Guide", *European Economic Review*, vol. 43, pp. 959-979.

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Laffont and Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", *Econometrica*, vol. 59, pp. 1735-54.

Salanie (1997), The Economics of Contracts, The MIT Press. Cap. 6.

Wilson, R. (1993), Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.

Tirole (1986), "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations", *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, vol. 2, pp. 181-214.

Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), "Collusion in Hierarchical Agencies", *Econometrica*, vol. 61, pp. 629-656.

Baliga (1999), "Collusion and Soft Information", *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, vol. 15, pp. 434-440.

Bolton y Dewatripont (2005). Contract Theory, MIT Press. Capítulos 7 y 8.

Riley and Samuelson (1981), "Optimal Auctions", *American Economic Review*, vol. 71, pp. 381-392.

Maskin and Riley (2000), "Asymmetric Auctions", *Review of Economic Studies*, vol. 67, pp. 413-438.

McAfee and McMillan (1987), "Auctions and Bidding", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 25, pp. 699-738.